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DOING THE PUBLIC A DISSERVICE:
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND
MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO
ALISON M. NEWMAN†
ABSTRACT
When deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction or a stay
pending appeal, courts consider, among other factors, whether
granting the preliminary injunction or stay would disserve the public
interest. In the context of individual-rights cases, courts often
experience pressure to remedy the alleged constitutional harms
immediately. However, behavioral-economic concepts demonstrate
that such quick action can negatively affect society as a whole.
Specifically, granting a right and then taking it away, as happens
when a lower court grants a right and is reversed on appeal, results in
a net loss to society. Using the recent same-sex marriage litigation, this
analysis demonstrates that to avoid disserving the public interest,
courts should consider the behavioral-economic effects of loss
aversion and the endowment effect within the public-interest factor of
the tests for preliminary relief and should attempt to maintain the
status quo until the decisions are final.

INTRODUCTION
In headline-grabbing individual-rights cases, there is always a
sense of urgency—there is an alleged unjust constitutional violation
and it needs to be rectified immediately. Even before a judgment is
final or the litigants have exhausted their appeals, one’s first reaction
is to right the wrong immediately. However, the tests for both a
preliminary injunction and a stay pending appeal require
consideration of the public interest. Often this factor is overlooked or
summarily discussed.
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However, behavioral-economic concepts of loss aversion and the
endowment effect show that the uncertainty that can follow from
quick action can be worse for society as a whole. In deciding whether
to grant a preliminary injunction or stay a permanent injunction
pending appeal, courts should consider this uncertainty’s possible
effects within the existing analytical framework and seek to maintain
the status quo until a final decision is rendered. This concept can be
illustrated by examining one of the major individual-rights issues in
recent memory: same-sex marriage.
1
With few exceptions, state and federal trial-court decisions since
2
United States v. Windsor have struck down state provisions outlawing
3
same-sex marriage as unconstitutional. However, courts have
1. See, e.g., Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 925 (E.D. La. 2014) (“It would no
doubt be celebrated to be in the company of the near-unanimity of the many other federal
courts that have spoken to this pressing issue, if this Court were confident in the belief that
those cases provide a correct guide.”).
2. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
3. Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No. 4:14-cv-4081, 2015 WL 144567, at *11 (D.S.D. Jan. 12,
2015); Campaign for S. Equality v. Bryant, No. 3:14-cv-818, 2014 WL 6680570, at *40–41 (S.D.
Miss. Nov. 25, 2014); Rolando v. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1236 (D. Mont. 2014); Condon v.
Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 589 (D.S.C. 2014); Lawson v. Kelly, No. 14-622-cv, 2014 WL 5810215,
at *10 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2014); McGee v. Cole, Civ. A. No. 3:13-24068, 2014 WL 5802665, at
*10 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 7, 2014); Marie v. Moser, No. 14-cv-2518, 2014 W 5598128, at *22 (D.
Kan. Nov. 4, 2014); Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-cv-200, 2014 WL 5317797, at *9 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17,
2014); Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1315–16 (D. Ariz. 2014); Hamby v. Parnell, No.
3:14-cv-89, 2014 WL 5089399, at *12 (D. Alaska Oct. 12, 2014); Gen. Synod of the United
Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790, 792 (W.D.N.C. 2014), appeal filed, No. 14-2225
(4th Cir. Nov. 10, 2014); Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 550 (W.D. Ky. 2014), rev’d sub
nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL
213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015); Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1164–65 (S.D. Ind. 2014),
aff’d, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014);
Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1028 (W.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan,
766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014);
Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431–32 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F.
Supp. 2d 1128, 1147 (D. Or. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1087 (D. Idaho 2014),
aff’d, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g denied, Nos. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2015 WL
12817, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2015); DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich.
2014), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. Jan.
16, 2015); Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 759, 772 (M.D. Tenn. 2014), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir.
2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F.
Supp. 2d 632, 665–66 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 2014 WL 683680, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d sub
nom. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Rainey v. Bostic, 135
S. Ct. 286 (2014); Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1292–93 (N.D. Fla. 2014); Bishop v.
United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d sub nom.
Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); Kitchen v.
Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); Wright v. Arkansas, No. 60CV-13-2662, 2013 WL 1908815, at *13
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fractured on their treatment of whether to stay their decisions
pending appeal. After the Supreme Court issued a stay pending
4
appeal in Herbert v. Kitchen, Utah’s same-sex-marriage case, most
5
district courts followed suit. Since the Court’s denial of certiorari in
6
the same-sex-marriage cases, however, that trend has reversed. And
some appellate courts have stepped in when trial courts have failed to
stay their decisions, recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex
7
marriage.
Courts have generally cited Kitchen when issuing stays in same8
sex marriage cases, with some even lamenting that Kitchen has forced
9
their hands. However, behavioral-economic concepts reinforce the
Supreme Court’s short order: according to the theories of loss
10
aversion and the endowment effect, repeatedly disrupting the status
quo by granting and withdrawing rights harms society regardless of
(Ark. Cir. Ct. May 9, 2014); Brinkman v. Long, No. 13-cv-32572 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 9, 2014);
Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 368–69 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law. Div. 2013); Griego v.
Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 (N.M. 2013).
4. Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893, 893 (2014).
5. See infra notes 18–48.
6. See Josh Blackman, Is Herbert v. Kitchen Still Good Law?, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG
(Oct. 16, 2014), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/10/16/is-herbert-v-kitchen-still-good-law
(“By denying certiorari on the petition for certiorari from the 10th Circuit, the stay originally
granted in Herbert v. Kitchen has been lifted.”). Because the Court has since denied stays
pending appeal in same-sex-marriage cases, it would appear that Kitchen is no longer binding.
See, e.g., Order in Pending Case, Parnell v. Hamby, 135 S. Ct. 299, 399 (2014) (denying stay);
Order in Pending Case, Otter v. Latta, 135 S. Ct. 345 (2014) (denying stay).
7. Order, Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2386 (7th Cir. June 27, 2014); Order, DeBoer v.
Snyder, No. 14-1341 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014); Order, DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341 (6th Cir.
Mar. 22, 2014).
8. See Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 484 (“In accordance with the Supreme Court’s issuance of
a stay in Kitchen v. Herbert, and consistent with the reasoning provided in Bishop[ v. Rainey],
this Court s[t]ays execution of this injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.”); Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1296 (“In accordance with the
U.S. Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in . . . [Herbert v. Kitchen], the Court stays execution of
this injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals.”). In light of the denial of cert in the case, scholars have already begun questioning
whether Herbert remains good law. See supra note 6.
9. See Order at 3–4, DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) (White, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court’s short order in Herbert v. Kitchen “provides little
guidance” and that the Court’s four-factor test for an injunction did not warrant a stay); Order
at 3, Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. May 20, 2014) (Hurwitz, J., concurring) (“I concur in
the order granting the stay pending appeal . . . solely because I believe that the Supreme Court,
in Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014), has virtually instructed courts of appeals to grant
stays in the circumstances before us today. If we were writing on a cleaner slate, I would
conclude that application of the familiar factors in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009),
counsels against the stay requested by the Idaho appellants.”).
10. See infra Part III.B–C.
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which outcome a given person or society as a whole prefers. This logic
11
has applications beyond the same-sex-marriage realm. For instance,
challengers of state abortion restrictions usually ask for preliminary
12
injunctions to prevent the laws from going into effect. While these
cases are litigated, such restrictions should be prevented from taking
effect in order to maintain the prelitigation status quo until there is a
final decision. To do otherwise ignores the practicalities of the
situation. Behavioral-economic concepts, which some legal scholars
13
argue should be taken into consideration, indicate that granting and
then withdrawing a right elicits a different effect on utility than never
having granted the right at all. These effects should be considered
within the established test for preliminary injunctions. That
framework need not be modified in this context, as societal utility
14
losses can be measured under the public-interest prong.
Part I provides background on the current state of same-sexmarriage litigation in the United States. Part II reviews the law on
preliminary injunctions and stays pending appeal. Part III explains
loss aversion and the endowment effect. Part IV applies that analysis
to the same-sex-marriage cases currently working their way through
courts across the country, showing that the repeated granting and
withdrawal of a right works to the detriment of society as a whole
regardless of one’s opinions on the merits. Part V discusses further
applications of the concept, specifically in the context of abortion
restrictions.

11. See infra Part V.
12. See, e.g., De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 639 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (considering the
plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction). For purposes of this analysis, a preliminary
injunction preventing a law from going into effect is functionally identical to a stay of a ruling
pending appeal. Both serve to delay legal change, regardless of whether the source is legislative
or judicial.
13. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of
Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1771–72 (1998) (explaining that the endowment effect and loss
aversion undermine the central tenets of traditional law and economics); Eyal Zamir, Loss
Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 829, 833 (2012) (arguing that due to loss aversion the
law should favor withholding over withdrawing a right). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp,
Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1991) (discussing the
endowment effect’s potential applications to legal policy).
14. Cf. generally James Powers, Note, A Status Quo Bias: Behavioral Economics and the
Federal Preliminary Injunction Standard, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1027 (2014) (arguing that courts
should not consider status quo bias outside the current test for preliminary injunctions).
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I. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
Same-sex marriage has grown astonishingly quickly. In 2003,
15
Massachusetts became the first state to allow same-sex marriage,
and in the twelve years since, same-sex marriage has been approved
in an unprecedented forty-five other states and the District of
16
Columbia.
Forty-six states and the District of Columbia have approved
same-sex marriage in trial courts, although many of the court
decisions are currently being appealed: thirty-four states did so by
17
18
19
20
court decision (Alabama,
Alaska,
Arizona,
Arkansas,
21
22
23
24
25
26
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,

15. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970–71 (Mass. 2003).
16. See infra notes 23–63.
17. Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-208-CG-N, 2015 WL 328728, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015)
(striking down a state statute and state constitutional amendment on due-process and equalprotection grounds).
18. See Hamby v. Parnell, No. 3:14-cv-89, 2014 WL 5089399, at *12 (D. Alaska Oct. 12,
2014) (striking down state statutes and a state constitutional amendment on due-process and
equal-protection grounds).
19. See Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1315–16 (D. Ariz. 2014) (striking down state
statutes and a state constitutional amendment on equal-protection grounds).
20. See Wright v. Arkansas, No. 60CV-13-2662, 2014 WL 1908815, at *13 (Ark. Cir. Ct.
May 9, 2013) (striking down a state statute and state constitutional amendment on right-toprivacy and equal-protection grounds). This decision was stayed by the state supreme court
pending appeal. Formal Order, Smith v. Wright, No. CV-14-427 (Ark. May 16, 2014).
21. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003–04 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (striking
down a state constitutional amendment on federal due-process and equal-protection grounds),
aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
22. See Brinkman v. Long, No. 13-cv-32572, at *48 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 9, 2014) (striking
down a state statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and dueprocess grounds). The trial court stayed its decision pending appeal. Id.
23. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 476–81 (Conn. 2008) (permitting
same-sex marriage on state constitutional equal-protection grounds).
24. See Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1292–93 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (striking down a
state statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process
grounds).
25. See Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1087 (D. Idaho 2014) (striking down a state
statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process
grounds), aff’d, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g denied, Nos. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668,
2015 WL 12817, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2015).
26. See Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1164–65 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (striking down a
state statute on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds), aff’d, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir.
2014), cert. denied sub nom. Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). The Seventh Circuit stayed
the district court’s decision pending appeal. Order, Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2386 (7th Cir. June
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32

Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
33
34
35
36
37
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
38
39
40
41
42
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South

27, 2014). Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, the district court’s ruling
went into effect. See Bogan, 135 S. Ct. at 316 (denying certiorari).
27. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009) (permitting same-sex marriage
on state equal-protection grounds).
28. Marie v. Moser, No. 14-cv-2518, 2014 WL 5598128, at *22 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2014)
(striking down a state statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection
and due-process grounds).
29. See Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 544 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (striking down a state
statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process
grounds), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014), cert. granted,
No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015). The district court stayed its decision pending
the state’s appeal. Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 550 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
30. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969–71 (Mass. 2003)
(permitting same-sex marriage on state equal-protection grounds).
31. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (striking down a
state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds), rev’d,
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015). The
Sixth Circuit stayed the district court’s decision pending appeal. Order, DeBoer v. Snyder, No.
14-1341 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2014).
32. Campaign for S. Equality v. Bryant, No. 3:14-cv-818, 2014 WL 6680570, at *40–41 (S.D.
Miss. Nov. 25, 2014) (striking down a state statute and state constitutional amendment on
federal equal-protection and due-process grounds). The district court’s decision was stayed by
the Fifth Circuit pending appeal. Campaign for S. Equality v. Bryant, 773 F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir.
2014).
33. Lawson v. Kelly, No. 14-622-cv, 2014 WL 5810215, at *10 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2014)
(striking down a state statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection
and due-process grounds).
34. Rolando v. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1236 (D. Mont. 2014) (striking down a state
statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection grounds).
35. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 476–77 (9th Cir. 2014) (striking down state statutes and
constitutional amendments on federal equal-protection grounds), rev’g Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911
F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012).
36. See Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 368–69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb.
21, 2013) (permitting same-sex marriage on federal equal-protection grounds).
37. See Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 (N.M. 2013) (permitting same-sex marriage on
state equal-protection grounds).
38. See Gen. Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790, 792
(W.D.N.C. 2014) (striking down state statutes on due-process and equal-protection grounds),
appeal filed, No. 14-2225 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2014).
39. Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1061 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (striking down a state
statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process
grounds), rev’d, DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015
WL 213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015).
40. See Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1297 (N.D. Okla.
2014) (striking down a state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and dueprocess grounds), aff’d sub nom. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
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48

Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
49
50
51
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming ); eight states and the
52
53
54
District of Columbia did so by legislation (Delaware, Hawaii,

135 S. Ct. 271 (2014). The Tenth Circuit stayed its decision pending the state’s petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 1096. Because the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in the case, the ruling went into effect. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 271, 271 (2014).
41. See Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1147 (D. Or. 2014) (striking down a state
statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process
grounds).
42. See Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431–32 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (striking down a
state statute on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds).
43. Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 589 (D.S.C. 2014) (striking down a state statute
and constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds).
44. Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No. 4:14-cv-4081, 2015 WL 144567, at *11 (D.S.D. Jan. 12,
2015) (striking down a state statute and constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection
and due-process grounds).
45. See Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759, 771–72 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (granting a
preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of a state constitutional amendment and
state statute against the plaintiffs on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds), rev’d,
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015). The
district court’s ruling applies only to the six plaintiffs in the case. Id. at 772.
46. See De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 665–66 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (striking down a
state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds). The
district court stayed its decision pending the state’s appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 665.
47. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2013) (permitting samesex marriage on federal equal-protection grounds), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014). The Supreme Court stayed the district court’s decision pending the
state’s appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Order in Pending Case, Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893,
893 (2014). Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, the ruling will go into
effect. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. at 265.
48. See Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 483–84 (E.D. Va. 2014) (striking down a state
constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds), aff’d sub nom.
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S.
Ct. 286 (2014). The district court stayed its decision pending the state’s appeal to the Fourth
Circuit. Id. at 484. The Supreme Court then stayed the Fourth Circuit’s decision pending the
state’s petition for certiorari. McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 32, 32 (2014). Because the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in the case, the ruling will go into effect. Rainey, 135 S. Ct. at 286.
49. McGee v. Cole, Civ. A. No. 3:13-24068, 2014 WL 5802665, at *10 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 7,
2014) (striking down a state statute on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds).
50. See Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1028 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (striking down a state
constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds), aff’d sub nom.
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct.
316 (2014). The district court stayed its decision pending the state’s appeal to the Seventh
Circuit. Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-cv-64, 2014 WL 2693963, at *7 (W.D. Wis. June 13, 2014).
Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, the ruling will go into effect. Walker,
135 S. Ct. at 316.
51. Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-cv-200, 2014 WL 5317797, at *9 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014)
(striking down a state statute based on federal equal-protection grounds).
52. D.C. CODE § 46-401 (Supp. 2014).
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Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island,
60
61
and Vermont ); and three did so by popular vote (Maine,
62
63
Maryland, and Washington ). More than half of the American
64
population now lives in a state in which same-sex marriage is legal.
II. THE LAW ON PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AND
STAYS PENDING APPEAL
To receive a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must satisfy four
factors: “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the
65
public interest.” Lower courts disagree on whether these factors

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 129 (West Supp. 2012).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (West 2014).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/10 (West Supp. 2014).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West Supp. 2014).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney Supp. 2014).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1 (2013).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2010).
See BUREAU OF CORPS., ELECTIONS, & COMM’NS, NOVEMBER 6, 2012, REFERENDUM
ELECTION TABULATIONS: COUNTY AND STATEWIDE TOTALS (2012), available at
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2012/tab-ref-2012.html (approving same-sex marriage with
52.7 percent of the vote).
62. See STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2012 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
(2012), available at http://www.elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/results/general/gen_qresults_
2012_4_00_1.html (approving same-sex marriage with 52.4 percent of the vote).
63. See WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, NOVEMBER 06, 2012 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
(2012), available at http://vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/Referendum-Measure-No-74-Concernsmarriage-for-same-sex-couples.html (approving same-sex marriage with 53.7 percent of the
vote).
64. Nate Silver & Allison McCann, Same-Sex Marriage Is Now Legal for a Majority of the
U.S., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 6, 2014, 12:27 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/same-sexmarriage-is-now-legal-for-a-majority-of-the-u-s. Because some federal appellate decisions
striking down bans on same-sex marriage apply to other states’ prohibitions, this number is
expected to rise. For example, the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193
(10th Cir. 2014), applies to similar laws in Wyoming and Colorado, which as of the denial of
certiorari had not allowed same-sex marriage. See Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-cv-200, 2014 WL
5317797, at *9 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014) (granting a preliminary injunction under Herbert and
Bishop). With those additional states taken into account, this number should increase to
approximately 60 percent. Silver & McCann, supra.
65. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Although the tests for
granting a preliminary injunction and staying an injunction are similar, “the differences in
posture mean that the two tests are not identical.” 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & CATHERINE T. STRUVE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

NEWMAN IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

DOING THE PUBLIC A DISSERVICE

2/26/2015 12:51 AM

1181

should be considered on a sliding scale, in which some factors can be
weaker provided that others are sufficiently strong, or considered
strictly, requiring that each of the four factors be found by a
66
preponderance of the evidence. Currently, only the Fourth Circuit
67
uses the strict reading.
The circuit split over the reading of the test for a preliminary
injunction stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v.
68
Natural Resources Defense Council, in which the Court considered
whether to grant an injunction prohibiting the Navy from performing
training exercises until after an environmental study had been
69
completed. The Court stated that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary
70
injunction must establish” the four factors. The Fourth Circuit has
interpreted this mandatory language to mean that each individual
factor must be established by a preponderance, not that the factors
71
must collectively be balanced. Winter overturned the Ninth Circuit’s
rather extreme sliding-scale approach, which had permitted the grant
of a preliminary injunction with only a possibility of irreparable harm
72
as long as there was a strong likelihood of success on the merits.
Other circuits have concluded that a different formulation of the
73
sliding scale is still permissible under Winter.

PROCEDURE § 3954 (4th ed. 2008). Because the common element of the public interest is the
main focus of this analysis, the two tests can be considered together.
66. See Rachel A. Weisshaar, Note, Hazy Shades of Winter: Resolving the Circuit Split over
Preliminary Injunctions, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1032–48 (2012) (reviewing the current circuit
split).
67. See Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.2d 307, 320–21 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[I]n light of Winter, this
Court recalibrated that test, requiring that each preliminary injunction factor be ‘satisfied as
articulated.’” (quoting The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir.
2009), vacated on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), aff’d The Real
Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam))); The Real Truth
About Obama, Inc., 575 F.3d at 347 (replacing the balance-of-hardship test in light of Winter).
68. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
69. Id. at 12.
70. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
71. Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.2d 307, 320–21 (4th Cir. 2013).
72. Winter, 555 U.S. at 21 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s holding “that when a plaintiff
demonstrates a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction may be
entered based only on a ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm” (citations omitted)).
73. See, e.g., Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011)
(noting that “some version of the sliding scale test” could survive Winter); Hoosier Energy
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009) (“How
strong a claim on the merits is enough depends on the balance of harms: the more net harm an
injunction can prevent, the weaker the plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while still
supporting some preliminary relief.” (citations omitted)).
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To grant a stay of an injunction pending appeal, a court must find
that four factors balance in the proponent’s favor: (1) he is likely to
succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm
without the stay, (3) the threatened injury outweighs any damage the
stay may cause the other party, and (4) the stay will not disserve the
74
public interest. According to most circuits, “A high probability of
success on the merits is not always required; the greater the harm
worked by the judgment the lower the required showing of probable
75
success.” Although these elements closely resemble the test for
76
issuing a permanent injunction, the two are not identical.
The likelihood of irreparable injury can be conceptualized in two
ways. First, it could be the same overall likelihood of irreparable
injury used in deciding whether to issue an injunction. Alternatively,
it could be the likelihood of irreparable injury due to the delay that a
stay would cause. In individual-rights cases, this distinction is unlikely
to matter: when an individual constitutional right is infringed, the
77
injury is irreparable and happens continuously. The balance of
hardships could similarly be framed as either the overall balance or
the balance attributable only to the stay. Again, the distinction will
likely not matter: since it is an individual constitutional violation, the
balance of hardships is not especially relevant because plaintiffs suffer
a continuous violation of their rights. In individual-rights cases, the
78
public-interest factor is arguably the most important.
Because the factors considered in granting a stay are nearly
identical to those considered in granting an injunction, the decisions
under the two tests often line up. In considering whether to grant a
permanent injunction, the public interest is not always especially
74. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 3954 (citing Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776
(1987)).
75. Id. at n.28.
76. Id. The test for issuing a permanent injunction is that (1) the plaintiff has suffered an
irreparable injury, (2) remedies at law are inadequate, (3) the balance of hardships weighs in the
plaintiff’s favor, and (4) an injunction would not disserve the public interest. eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
77. See Beatrice Catherine Franklin, Note, Irreparability, I Presume? On Assuming
Irreparable Harm for Constitutional Violations in Preliminary Injunctions, 45 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. REV. 623, 634–45 (2014) (describing the circuit split over whether courts presume
irreparable harm for constitutional violations).
78. In other circumstances, courts have noted that “the public interest is a factor to be
strongly considered.” Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983). Lopez considered
the restoration of disability benefits to Social Security recipients, id. at 1433–34, but the same
logic would apply to violations of individual constitutional rights, given their likely societal
effects.
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important; the focus is instead on the likelihood of success and
irreparable harm. The Supreme Court has stated that in evaluating a
request for a stay, the “most critical” factors are the appellant’s
likelihood of success on the merits and whether he would suffer
79
irreparable harm if the stay were not granted. However, under
80
Winter, a court still “must” consider all four factors.
In contrast, in deciding whether to grant a stay or a preliminary
injunction, different considerations are important than in deciding
whether to grant permanent injunctions: by their nature, the former
decisions are temporary and subject to change in the near future. The
public-interest prong is not the same for preliminary and permanent
relief, including the decision to stay—that prong directs courts to
consider whether there are “policy considerations that bear on
81
whether the order should issue.” Therefore, if a temporary stay or
preliminary injunction could have some effect on the public that a
permanent injunction would not, the court’s decision could change.
Under the Fourth Circuit’s strict approach, the probability of a
preliminary injunction not disserving the public interest could drop
below a preponderance, and the injunction would not be granted.
Under the balancing test, however, the balance could shift away from
granting a preliminary injunction or denying its stay.
Three circuits have recognized that temporary relief could harm
society because it changes the legal landscape without a final
judgment. The Tenth Circuit applies a heightened standard for
granting preliminary relief when that relief would change the status
82
quo. The Second and Ninth Circuits impose a heightened burden for
mandatory as opposed to prohibitory injunctions and define
83
mandatory injunctions as those that change the status quo. In each

79. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
80. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
81. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 2948.4.
82. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991)
(“[Injunctions that disturb the status quo] are disfavored and they require that the movant
satisfy an even heavier burden of showing that the four factors listed above weigh heavily and
compellingly in movant’s favor before such an injunction may be issued.”), overruled on other
grounds, O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 975 (10th
Cir. 2004) (en banc).
83. See Sunward Elecs., Inc v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying a
heightened standard when the “injunction sought is mandatory—i.e., it will alter, rather than
maintain, the status quo”); Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting
that mandatory injunctions, which alter the status quo, are “particularly disfavored” (quoting
Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979))).
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of these situations, the effect of a temporary change is considered as
something separate from the existing four-factor test for preliminary
84
relief. All three circuits distinguish between temporary and
permanent relief, which the current test for whether to grant a stay
does not explicitly account for. However, when combined with
developments in the realm of behavioral economics and its better
understanding of seemingly irrational behavior, these considerations
of the societal effects fit neatly within the final prong of the
preliminary-relief tests.
III. THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT AND LOSS AVERSION
Behavioral-economic principles help explain why the temporary
nature of preliminary injunctions can disserve the public interest even
when a permanent injunction would not. According to the theories of
loss aversion and the endowment effect, people value rights more
highly once they possess them; changing the status quo through
preliminary injunctions and later restoring it would therefore disserve
the public interest. It is easy to argue that if a person did not possess a
right in the first place, nothing is lost by reverting to the initial state of
affairs. That argument is an oversimplification—behavioral-economic
research shows that people value rights more highly once they
actually possess them and that they feel losses more strongly than
85
gains. Therefore, giving someone a right and then taking it away
results in a net loss to his utility.
A. The Coase Theorem
The starting point for any analysis of the efficient allocation of
rights is the Coase Theorem, which derives from Professor Ronald H.
86
Coase’s 1960 paper, “The Problem of Social Cost.” The Coase
Theorem states that in the absence of transaction costs, the initial
allocation of property rights does not matter, as people will be able to
bargain around that allocation and will always reach the efficient

84. For a criticism of this approach, see generally Powers, supra note 14.
85. Although the economic literature typically focuses on tangible goods, this effect has
been shown to apply to legal rights. See JUDD HAMMACH & GARDNER M. BROWN, JR.,
WATERFOWL AND WETLANDS: TOWARDS BIOECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26 (1974) (finding that
duck hunters would pay an average of $247 to obtain the right to keep a particular area of
wetlands undeveloped, but if they already possessed that right, they would demand an average
of $1044 to sell it).
86. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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result. However, when there are transaction costs, as there typically
are in real-world situations, those costs can be prohibitively high, and
the initial allocation of property rights will change the final
88
allocation.
The theorem has been applied outside of the realm of tangible
property. For instance, introductory microeconomics students often
analyze a simple problem: A and B are roommates; A is a smoker, B
89
is not. B values having a smoke-free apartment at $100, while A
values his right to smoke at $90. A currently possesses a “right to
smoke.” If B does not want him to smoke, he will have to pay A a
certain amount of money to keep him from smoking. Because B
values his right to a smoke-free apartment more highly than A values
the right to smoke in the apartment, there is some amount of money
(between $90 and $100) that B can pay A to keep him from smoking.
If B pays A $90, A is in the same position he was in—he can no longer
smoke in the apartment, but he has $90 to offset his $90 loss. B is $10
better off—he paid $90 to gain a $100 benefit. In this limited world,
societal value has increased by $10.
Now suppose that B possesses the right to a smoke-free
apartment. Here, no transaction would take place because the most A
would be willing to pay to be able to smoke is $90, the value he places
on the right. B would not accept less than $100 to give up the right. In
the absence of transaction costs or other barriers to bargaining, the
same efficient allocation of property rights would be reached
regardless of the initial allocation.
The presence of transaction costs can cause inertia, with parties
maintaining the initial allocation even when it is not the most
90
efficient. In the same-sex-marriage context, supporters of traditional
marriage were initially allocated a legal right. While they continue to
possess the right, the above analysis would suggest either that
traditional marriage is efficient or, more likely, that transaction costs

87. Id. at 2–7.
88. Id. at 15–17.
89. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN
APPROACH 648–50 (8th ed. 2010) (discussing this problem). This problem is also often framed
as one roommate who wishes to play loud music while the other prefers silence.
90. Imagine, for instance, that it would cost $15 to create a contract between the two. If A
were initially allocated the right, B would need to pay him $90 for the right plus the $15
transaction cost. The $105 cost would exceed what B would be willing to pay, and the right
would remain with A. Note that this is an inefficient outcome—society as a whole gains if B
possesses the right.
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in the form of political barriers are too high to move from the initial
allocation.
B. The Endowment Effect
The simple proposition embodied in the Coase Theorem—that
in the absence of transaction costs scarce resources will be allocated
to those who value them most—does not seem to accurately reflect
behavior. The “endowment effect,” a term coined by Professor
91
Richard Thaler in 1980, better reflects reality. In its simplest form, it
describes the hypothesis that people assign a higher value to things
based merely on the fact that they own them, challenging the
assumption of the rational-economic actor. The endowment effect
suggests that, contrary to the Coase Theorem, the initial endowment
can matter even absent transaction costs: the initial allocation of a
legal entitlement will affect trading and bargaining because the
92
possessor of the right will value it more. Therefore, the entitlement
should be initially allocated to the person who values it more highly.
Otherwise, the individual who owns the entitlement may be unwilling
to trade it even if that would lead to the efficient outcome. Using the
above roommate example, assume that the objective value of A’s
right to smoke—the amount he would be willing to pay B for the
right—is $90, and that B is willing to pay $100 to buy that right from
A. However, because of the endowment effect, if A were initially
allocated the right, his subjective valuation of the right, and therefore
the payment he would require to give it up, would be higher. If that
valuation exceeded $100, no trade with B would take place because B
would not pay more than $100 for the right to a smoke-free
apartment.
“[T]he main effect of endowment is not to enhance the appeal of
93
the good one owns, only the pain of giving it up.” This distinction
arises because people view opportunity costs and out-of-pocket costs
differently. An opportunity cost is the value of the best option
forgone when a choice has to be made between mutually exclusive
alternatives. Out-of-pocket costs refer to the costs incurred by losing
something in one’s possession. Though rational economics would

91. Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 39, 44 (1980).
92. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of the Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1997).
93. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197 (1991).
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dictate that opportunity costs be perceived as equivalent to out-ofpocket costs by a rational actor, experiments have shown that not to
94
be the case. People view out-of-pocket costs as losses and
95
opportunity costs as forgone gains. Therefore, out-of-pocket costs,
potential losses, are more heavily weighted because people are
96
typically loss-averse.
The endowment effect has been noted as being somewhat
97
intuitive. For example, even before serious experimental evidence of
the effect existed, companies were using it to their advantage. When
faced with charges levied on credit-card transactions, credit-card
company representatives argued for those extra charges to be framed
98
as discounts for using cash instead of charges for using credit cards.
If customers view not receiving the cash discount as an opportunity
cost of using the card but view a surcharge as an out-of-pocket
99
charge, this distinction makes sense. The discount is a potentially

94. See infra notes 100–09 and accompanying text.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1729, 1737 (1998) (“[T]he greatest force of the endowment effect in legal analysis may be
to bolster the law’s insight that aspirations are not the same as ownership . . . .”). Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. similarly observed that it is in a person’s nature to value something he owns more
highly than something he hopes for. See id. (citing Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897) (“It is the nature of a man’s mind. A thing which you have
enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in
your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend
yourself, however you came by it.”)). Additionally, scholars have connected the endowment
effect to emotional rather than cognitive factors, offering four potential emotional explanations
for the endowment effect. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1, 33–35 (2007). The first is pure loss aversion, in which losing something “simply hurts
more” than not having it at all. Id. at 34 (quoting Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and
Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1251–52 (2003)). This explanation is based on an
illogical bias—losing something and not gaining it at all register differently emotionally. Id. The
second is attachment, in which the endowment effect stems from the simple fact that owning
something adds sentimental or other value that is more than the thing’s objective value as a
commodity. Id. The third is regret avoidance, in which giving up a right is more likely to cause
regret in the future than is never having possessed it. Id. The fourth is the disutility of selling, in
which the endowment effect is caused by an aversion to participating in a sale, particularly if the
sale involves commodifying a right that the seller does not believe can be appropriately
commodified. Id.
98. See FCBA Two-Tier Pricing and Procedures for Federal Reserve Board Regulation
Writing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Hous.
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 4 (1975) (statement of Jeffrey M. Bucher, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System) (“Critics argued that a surcharge carries the connotation of a
penalty on credit card users while a discount is viewed as a bonus to cash customers.”).
99. Thaler, supra note 91, at 45.
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forgone gain, while the surcharge is seen as a loss. The framing, of
course, has absolutely no effect on consumers’ bottom line—either
way they have paid the fee. Depending on the phrasing, however,
consumers will view the charge as either a loss or a forgone gain.
The classic example of the endowment effect arises from a series
of experiments performed by Professors Daniel Kahneman, Jack
100
Knetsch, and Richard Thaler. Half of the subjects were given coffee
101
mugs worth six dollars. These mugs were arbitrarily distributed to
102
every other participant. The participants were then told to bargain
103
over the mugs. In the absence of any endowment effect, economic
theory would dictate that half of the mugs would be traded from
104
those who valued them less to those who valued them more.
However, very few of the mugs were actually traded because the
median seller demanded $5.25 to trade, while the median buyer was
105
willing to pay only $2.25 to $2.75 to acquire a mug. Those who
possessed the mugs valued them approximately twice as highly as
106
those who did not. Notably, this effect was evident even though the
participants possessed the mugs for a very short period before
107
bargaining began. The authors concluded that each owner of a mug
108
valued it more highly for no other reason than that he owned it.
Additionally, the short time period between participants’ receipt of
the mugs and the opportunity to trade suggests the existence of an
“instant endowment effect,” by which a person’s subjective value of
109
an item increases substantially as soon as he is given the object.
C. Loss Aversion
One explanation for the endowment effect is loss aversion, which
refers to the economic observation that the loss of something an

100. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1325 (1990).
101. Id. at 1330.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1328.
105. Id. at 1332.
106. Id. at 1343–44.
107. Id. at 1342. It has since been shown that the endowment effect is stronger the longer a
person possesses an item. Arlen, supra note 13, at 1771 n.19 (citing Michael A. Strahilevitz &
George Loewenstein, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 276, 285 (1998)).
108. Kahneman et al., supra note 100, at 1342.
109. Id.

NEWMAN IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

DOING THE PUBLIC A DISSERVICE

2/26/2015 12:51 AM

1189

individual owns has more of a negative effect than gaining it has a
110
positive effect. Loss aversion and the endowment effect can be
illustrated through a simple example offered by Kahneman, Knetsch,
111
and Thaler. In their example, an economist friend of the authors
had purchased wine that appreciated to two hundred dollars from ten
112
dollars at the time of purchase. The economist would drink some of
the wine but was “neither . . . willing to sell the wine at the [current]
113
price nor buy an additional bottle at that price.” This example
demonstrates that people demand a much higher price to give up an
114
object they own than they would be willing to pay to acquire it. This
behavior cannot be explained by rational-economic principles unless
there is some other effect at work.
Although people are ordinarily risk-averse, they have been
shown to be risk-seeking in choices between losses, irrationally
choosing a gamble over a sure value when the gamble has an equal or
lesser expected value. In an experiment conducted by Professors
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, subjects were offered a choice
115
between a sure loss of 3000 and an 80 percent chance of losing 4000.
Under rational economics, each subject would be expected to
consider the expected value of each choice and select the option with
116
the higher expected value. The expected value of a loss of 3000 is –
117
3000. The expected value of the gamble is –3200. Therefore, the
value of the sure loss, –3000, is greater than the expected value of the
gamble, –3200, so the subject would be expected to prefer the sure
loss. The majority of subjects nonetheless preferred the gamble,
demonstrating risk-seeking behavior in choices between negative
118
options.
In choices between gains, in contrast, people are risk-averse,
preferring a sure gain to a gamble with the same or an even higher

110. Id. at 1342–46.
111. Kahneman et al., supra note 93.
112. Id. at 194.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 266 (1979).
116. The expected value is the sum of all possible outcomes weighted by their probabilities.
117. The expected value is the probability of the loss, 0.8, times the expected loss, 4000,
added to the probability of no loss, 0.2, times zero. Thus, EV = (0.8)(4000) + (0.2)(0) = –3200.
118. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 115, at 268.
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expected value. A risk-averse person will choose a sure gain of 3000
over an 80 percent chance of receiving 3750 even though the expected
value of the gamble is also 3000 and a rational actor would be
indifferent between the options. Using the same numbers as above, a
person who is sufficiently risk-averse will choose a sure gain of 3000
over a gamble with an expected value of 3200 even though the gamble
has a higher expected value than the sure gain.
Loss aversion describes this phenomenon—the risk-seeking
behavior of choosing a gamble that has a larger expected loss over a
smaller but sure loss indicates, with the latter option, the fact that a
person has no chance of avoiding the loss is affecting his judgment. In
other words, the negative effect of that choice on a person’s utility is
enhanced because there is no way that he can avoid the loss.
Additionally, loss aversion means that a person’s reaction to an
event depends on whether he views it as a loss or a gain. “[W]hether
an event ‘codes’ as a loss or a gain depends not on simple facts but on
120
a range of contextual factors, including how the event is framed.”
For example, the status quo is typically the reference point for gains
and losses, “but it is possible to manipulate the frame so as to make a
121
change ‘code’ as a loss rather than a gain, or vice versa.” Consider
122
the credit-card example from above. The credit-card companies
were advocating that the charge for using a credit card be framed as a
discount for using cash rather than as a fee for using the card.
Regardless of how the charge is framed, the final result is the same:
people who pay with credit cards pay more than those who pay with
cash. A cash discount does not feel like a loss to credit-card users; it is
instead perceived as a forgone gain. If, however, the payment were
framed as a charge for using a card, the consumer would view it as a
loss because he would be paying more than the baseline cost paid by
cash consumers.

119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 269.
Sunstein, supra note 92, at 1180.
Id.
See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
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Figure 1: Value Function

123

Loss aversion manifests itself graphically as the value function
124
in Figure 1. The objective value of the change in the individual’s
stock of goods and services, including his legal rights, is shown on the
x-axis, and the subjective value to the individual is shown on the yaxis. If people were entirely rational, the two tails of the graph would
mirror each other: a loss or gain of some objective value would result
in a subjectively valued loss or gain of the same magnitude. From an
initial starting point at the origin, the reference point, a gain of
magnitude x increases the subjective value to the person by A. From
the same reference point, a loss of magnitude x will decrease the
125
value by B > A. The magnitude of B is greater than the magnitude
of A because a certain amount gained has less of a positive effect than
that same amount lost has a negative effect. This relationship is
shown in Figure 1 as the difference in slope over the course of the
value function. For a change of x from the reference point, a loss has
123. The graphs merely serve to illustrate the concepts discussed and do not reflect specific
empirical data.
124. Scholars have offered multiple justifications for the endowment effect. See, e.g., W.
Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?,
81 AM. ECON. REV. 635, 645–46 (1991) (offering a neoclassical account of the effect); Carey K.
Morewedge, Lisa L. Shu, Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Bad Riddance or Good
Rubbish? Ownership and Not Loss Aversion Causes the Endowment Effect, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 947, 950 (2009) (offering an attachment explanation).
125. See Thaler, supra note 91, at 41–43 (deriving the value function).
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a larger effect on subjective value than a gain. Therefore, the slope of
the “losses” tail of the value function in the bottom left quadrant is
steeper than the slope of the “gains” tail.
IV. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE DECISION TO STAY SAMESEX-MARRIAGE RULINGS
When a right is granted and then withdrawn, the endowment
126
effect and loss aversion are implicated. These behavioral-economic
effects demonstrate that, regardless of where society stands on a
particular issue, courts’ flip-flopping on whether a right exists is
detrimental to both sides. Courts should consider this foreseeable
harm to the public interest when deciding whether to grant a
preliminary injunction or stay a decision in individual-rights cases.
When plaintiffs sue to enjoin the government from enforcing
laws that allegedly infringe their constitutional rights, district courts
should consider the effect of disturbing the status quo before a final
decision is rendered. This would prevent courts from causing societal
utility losses through their reversals and would prevent the
uncertainty that accompanies those reversals. In individual-rights
cases, such as those involving same-sex marriage, plaintiffs generally
sue for an injunction barring the government from enforcing the
challenged constitutional provision or statute, or request a
preliminary injunction preventing it from going into effect while the
suit progresses. Importantly for courts, the timing of an injunction
affects social utility. In these contentious cases, appeals are nearly
inevitable and both sides are often willing to take the case to the
highest authority they can, certainly to the court of appeals and, most
127
likely, a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Therefore, the
likelihood of the district courts having the last word on the issue is
128
virtually nil. In other words, uncertainty and change are essentially
126. While one can—and proponents of California’s Proposition 8 did—argue that
withdrawing the name is not withdrawing anything of value, courts have repeatedly held that
the name “marriage” means something. See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir.
2012) (“We need consider only the many ways in which we encounter the word ‘marriage’ in our
daily lives and understand it, consciously or not, to convey a sense of significance.”), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
127. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S.
Ct. 506, 509 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he underlying legal question . . . is a difficult
question. It is a question, I believe, that at least four Members of this Court will wish to consider
irrespective of the Fifth Circuit’s ultimate decision.”).
128. The Court has not issued a stay in cases in which the state has declined to defend its
same-sex-marriage ban, see, e.g., Order in Pending Case, Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Geiger, 134
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inevitable in individual-rights litigation, a reality of which the courts
129
are well aware.
130
In Kitchen v. Herbert, a federal district court in Utah held that
the state’s constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage
131
violated the federal Constitution. Hours later, same-sex marriages
132
began to be performed in Utah. The state’s requests for a stay from
133
134
the district court and the Tenth Circuit were both denied. The
state then filed an application in the Supreme Court to stay the
135
district court’s judgment pending appeal to the Tenth Circuit. The
application was referred to the full Court and granted without
136
explanation. Same-sex marriage was legal in Utah for nineteen days,
137
and over 1300 marriage licenses were issued to same-sex couples. It
is unclear how many of those couples performed their marriage
ceremonies before the stay, but “news reports put the number at over
138
1000.” The state subsequently declared that it will not recognize

S. Ct. 2722, 2722 (2014) (denying stay); Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Or.
Att’y Gen. Ellen Rosenblum on the Subject of Pending Litigation Challenging Same-Sex
Marriage Ban (Feb. 20, 2014), available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/Pages/2014/
rel022014.aspx (“[T]he Oregon Department of Justice will not defend the prohibition in our
state’s constitution against marriages between people of the same sex.”), presumably because
under Hollingsworth, no one would have standing to do so, see Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668
(holding that private parties did not have standing to take over the defense of a same-sexmarriage ban from the state).
129. See, e.g., Brinkman v. Long, No. 13-cv-32572, at *48 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 9, 2014)
(“[T]he Court finds that a stay is necessary to avoid the instability and uncertainty which would
result in the state of Colorado if the Court did not stay its ruling and for the orderly
administration of justice.” (footnote omitted)).
130. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).
131. Id. at 1216.
132. Erik Eckholm, Federal Judge Rules that Same-Sex Marriage Is Legal in Utah, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2013, at A11.
133. Order on Motion To Stay at *1, Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6834634
(D. Utah Dec. 23, 2013).
134. Order Denying Emergency Motion for Stay and Temporary Motion for Stay at *2,
Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874 (10th Cir. Dec. 24, 2013).
135. Application to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal, Herbert v. Kitchen, No. 13A687 (U.S.
Dec. 31, 2013).
136. Order in Pending Case, Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893, 893 (2014). The order
appears to have been supported by every member of the Court, as it was not accompanied by
any dissents. Lyle Denniston, Court Stops Utah Gay Marriages, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 6, 2014,
10:34 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/01/court-stops-utah-gay-marriages.
137. Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1197 (D. Utah 2014).
138. Id.; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Halts Same-Sex Marriages in Utah Pending Appeal,
WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2014, 2:32 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-
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same-sex marriages performed before the stay, and the legal status
140
of those licenses issued after the stay is unclear. Couples married in
Utah before the stay were granted a preliminary injunction against
the state requiring that Utah recognize their marriages as legally
141
valid.
142
The Supreme Court stayed the district court’s decision until it
143
denied certiorari in the case. This uncertainty over the legal status
of marriages performed before the Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay
existed solely because the district court did not stay its decision and
the Supreme Court’s stay did not occur immediately. Had the stay
been immediate, no marriages would have been performed, and the
failure to issue a stay would not have caused further litigation.
Examining the societal effects of the district court’s decision under
both rational- and behavioral-economic frameworks demonstrates
that courts can avoid societal loss by considering loss aversion and the
endowment effect in deciding whether to issue temporary relief.

halts-same-sex-marriages-in-utah-pending-appeal/2014/01/06/b1af9794-76e9-11e3-b1c5739e63e9c9a7_story.html.
139. See Press Release, Utah Office of the Att’y Gen., Utah Att’y Gen. Sean D. Reyes
Official Statement (Jan. 8, 2014), available at http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/2014/01/08/utahattorney-general-sean-d-reyes-official-statement (“We are unable to reach a legal conclusion as
to the ultimate validity of marriage between persons of the same sex who completed their
marriage ceremony in Utah between Dec [sic] 20, 2013 and Jan. 6, 2014. That question remains
unanswered and the answer will depend on the result of the appeal process.”).
140. See Jacob Gershman, So What Happens to the Same-Sex Marriage Licenses Issued in
Utah?, WALL ST. J. LAWBLOG (Jan. 6, 2014, 2:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/01/06/sowhat-happens-to-the-same-sex-marriage-licenses-issued-in-utah
(describing
the
similar
circumstances in California and New Mexico and noting that “[w]hen similar situations have
come up in other states, gay couples have remained legally married even when other gay
couples were prevented from joining them”). Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Herbert, it seems that Utah must honor those marriages. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265, 265
(2014).
141. Evans, 2014 WL 2048343, at *21. In Colorado, the courts took a slightly different
approach when the clerk for Boulder County continued to issue same-sex marriage licenses
even when under a court order to stop. The court allowed the clerk to continue to issue the
licenses but ordered the clerk to “provide reasonable notice to prospective and past recipients
of same-sex marriage licenses that the validity of their marriages is dependent upon whether a
court would find that [the clerk] had authority to allow same-sex marriages.” Colorado v. Hall,
No. 2014-cv-30833, at *23 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 10, 2014), aff’d, No. 2014-CA-1368 (Colo. App.
July 24, 2011), cert. granted, No. 2014-SC-582 (Colo. Sup. Ct. July 29, 2014). The Colorado
Supreme Court granted a stay when it granted certiorari in the case. Colorado v. Hall, No. 2014SC-582 (Colo. Sup. Ct. July 29, 2014).
142. Herbert v. Evans, 135 S. Ct. 16, 16 (2014).
143. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265, 265 (2014).
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Figure 2: Utility of Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage Under Rational
Economics

A. Rational Economics and the Decision to Stay
1. The Effect on Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage. Under
rational economics, withholding a right, granting that right, and then
withdrawing it would make no difference in terms of utility—it is the
final state of affairs that matters. Figure 2 shows a standard utility
144
function, U(x), in which x represents an individual’s stock of goods
and services, including his legal rights. If an individual’s initial utility
level is A, withholding the right to same-sex marriage would keep him
at utility level A. If the state instead permitted same-sex marriage,
that individual’s utility would increase by B to C. If the state then
withdrew the right, his utility would decrease from C by B and fall
back to A. Therefore, under rational economics, these shifts would
have no overall effect on utility.
2. The Effect on Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage. The situation
for opponents of same-sex marriage is the opposite. A judicial
decision permitting same-sex marriage would cause an opponent’s

144. For a description and derivation of a standard utility curve, see VARIAN, supra note 89,
at 54–67, 226–29.
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Figure 3: Utility of Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage Under Rational
Economics

Figure 4: The Effect of the District Court’s Ruling in Favor of SameSex Marriage on the Utility of Supporters

stock of “goods” in Figure 3 to fall by F, the objective value of the
right, causing the opponent’s utility to fall from E to G. Staying the
decision would cause utility to increase back to E. A final decision
permitting same-sex marriage would cause utility to fall back to G.
B. Behavioral Economics and the Decision to Stay
1. The Effect on Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage. On the other
hand, accounting for the endowment effect and loss aversion changes
the utility analysis on both sides of the issue. In Figure 4, if initial
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Figure 5: Value Function of Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage

utility is A, withholding the right to same-sex marriage would keep
utility at A because it is the loss of a potential gain, an opportunity
145
cost. Once same-sex marriages were permitted, one would expect an
increase in “goods” by B to cause utility to increase to C as it does
146
under rational-economic analysis. However, the endowment effect
suggests that once a person possesses a right like same-sex marriage,
147
he will value it more than rational economics would suggest. If in
value terms, the right to same-sex marriage is worth B, Figure 5 shows
that the gain would be worth B’ > B to that person. Thus, although a
right may be worth only B when measured objectively, once someone
possesses that right the endowment effect dictates that he will value it
148
at B’. As Figure 5 shows, an increase in the value of goods to B’
increases utility to C’ > C, the person’s utility without consideration
of the endowment effect.

145. See Figure 2. There is, of course, a strong argument that withholding the right to samesex marriage can make someone feel like an outcast in society, decreasing his utility because he
no longer feels like an equal member of society. See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton,
Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715, 738–39 (2000) (discussing the effects on an
individual’s utility when he does not feel accepted in society).
146. See Figure 2.
147. See supra Part III.
148. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 115, at 279.
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Figure 6: Effect of the Stay on Utility of Supporters of Same-Sex
Marriage

Figure 7: Value Function of Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage

Loss aversion has an effect when a right is withdrawn. In Figure
6, utility is now at C’. Rational economics dictates that utility would
fall by the same amount by which it increased, thereby falling by B’
back to A. Still, the withdrawal of a right would likely code as a loss
and implicate the endowment effect. Withdrawal of the right to same149
sex marriage would certainly code as a loss for its supporters.
Therefore, as shown in Figure 7, a loss of objective value B would

149. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
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Figure 8: Value Function for Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage

decrease the subjective value by B’’ > B’. As shown in Figure 6, the
individual’s stock of entitlements would fall by B’’, causing his utility
to fall from C’ to D < A. Whether the final value is compared to a
person’s initial, pre-same-sex-marriage utility or to his utility after the
right to same-sex marriage was granted, his utility has fallen.
Granting the right to same-sex marriage would increase
supporters’ stock of goods and services by B’, as shown in Figure 4.
150
As shown in Figure 6, because B’ < B’’, overall utility is less than C’
but greater than A and D. Therefore, although the individual has the
same entitlements as immediately after the right to same-sex marriage
was granted, his overall utility is lower from losing the right and
gaining it back.
2. The Effect on Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage. These
findings do not entail a net societal utility loss because not everyone
reacts the same way to the same events. For opponents of same-sex
marriage, granting the right to same-sex marriage would likely code
as a loss, and reinstating the traditional definition of marriage would
code as a gain.
The endowment effect would, as with supporters of same-sex
marriage, change the analysis. The value function for opponents of
same-sex marriage is shown in Figure 8. For those opponents,
granting the right to same-sex marriage would likely code as a loss.

150. See Figure 6.
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Figure 9: Utility of Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage

Under the rational-economic analysis, opponents of same-sex
151
marriage would be returned to their initial level of utility and, as
shown in Figure 9, utility would fall from E to G’ < G. When a stay is
issued and same-sex marriage again becomes illegal, Figure 9 shows
that the resulting gain of F’’ < F’ would be smaller than the loss
experienced due to the initial granting of the right to same-sex
marriage. Opponents’ utility would increase from G’ to H < E.
Therefore, both proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage will
have lost utility before the reinstatement of same-sex marriage.
Because losses are felt more heavily than gains, once a person
loses something he values, merely returning it cannot restore him to
his former level of utility. Once opponents of same-sex marriage lost
what they viewed as a right to the traditional definition of marriage,
reinstating that right was not enough to put them back in the same
place. Granting same-sex marriages would, as before, code as a loss,
causing utility to fall by F’ from H to below G’.

151. Cf. Figure 3.
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3. Underlying Assumptions of the Analysis. The above analysis
relies on three key assumptions. First, it assumes that all individuals
within a group have the same value and utility functions. This is a
simplifying assumption and is common in economic analysis even
though it may not accurately reflect reality. It is well known that some
people value certain rights more than others, particularly when the
rights have such a large effect on a subgroup of the total population.
Second, this analysis assumes that the objective value of each
group member’s definition of marriage is the same. It is certainly
possible that this objective value might be significantly higher for one
side than for the other. For example, if proponents value the right to
same-sex marriage more highly than opponents value the traditional
definition of marriage, then banning same-sex marriage will not
necessarily increase societal utility even if a larger percentage of the
population opposes same-sex marriage. The endowment effect and
loss aversion would still apply, but in a state that constitutionally
prohibits same-sex marriage, the vote might be closely split. In
California, for example, same-sex marriage was outlawed with 52.3
percent of the vote; the 47.7 percent who voted against Proposition 8
could have lost something of such great value, and felt that loss to
such a high degree, that Proposition 8’s passage resulted in a net loss
152
to society, in this case, the state of California.
The percentage
approval alone, therefore, may not be the best indication of what
maximizes societal utility. If the value to proponents of same-sex
marriage were high enough, even an 80 percent vote against same-sex
marriage may not mean that societal utility increased as a result.
Third, this analysis assumes that all people have the same value
function regardless of which group they are in and that the gain or
loss of each person’s definition of marriage has the same objective
value. In addition, the above analysis has not taken into account that
these value functions could have different shapes across groups. If
supporters of same-sex marriage had significantly steeper value
functions, a loss or gain of the same objective magnitude as an
opponent’s loss or gain would have a larger effect on supporters’

152. DEBRA BOWEN, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL ELECTION 7
(2008).
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Figure 10: Different Value Functions

utility. The effects of this assumption are shown in Figure 10. The
original value function V is shown in gray. A steeper value function
V’ is shown in black. An individual with value function V’ would feel
both gains and losses more severely than an individual with value
function V.
Therefore, if supporters of same-sex marriage had a value
function of V’ while opponents had a value function of V, supporters
would feel the loss of same-sex-marriage rights much more strongly
than opponents would feel the loss of their preferred definition of
marriage and would feel the gain much more strongly if same-sex
marriage were then reinstated. Thus, even with the same objective
value on each side of the debate, a majority vote does not necessarily
mean that societal utility has increased. If supporters’ value function
V’ is sufficiently steeper than opponents’, a win for opponents with
just over 52 percent of the vote would not lead to an increase in
utility. The gain felt by opponents of same-sex marriage, even as a
majority, would not be enough to offset supporters’ loss. Again, this
could result in a net societal loss even if the majority has experienced
a gain. On the other hand, if the gain to opponents of same-sex
marriage were large enough, the loss to supporters would be
overcome.
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C. Societal Implications of a Behavioral-Economic Analysis
This analysis has at least two implications. First, the repeated
switching of a right from one side to the other results in a net loss to
society, regardless of which side is correct from a policy perspective.
Each time a right is taken away and then returned, an individual has
lost utility. The same is true if a right is gained and then lost.
Therefore, regardless of the initial entitlements or what proportion of
people fall into each category, the act of switching a right from one
side to the other and back causes a loss to society. This is most easily
seen in Figure 9; each iteration of granting and then withdrawing a
right caused utility to fall by the amount corresponding to the
153
difference between F’ and F’’.
Second, each change’s ultimate effect on societal utility is unclear
and would depend on a number of variables and unpredictable
154
second-order effects, including the relative number of proponents
and opponents of same-sex marriage, how strongly their convictions
were held, and how pronounced the endowment effect was in each
case. Calculating the overall societal effects of the withdrawal of a
right would be a complex endeavor, one that judges should certainly
not wade into.
In the same-sex-marriage context, there is an added element of
complexity. Both sides view themselves as possessors of a right, which
will not be true in all individual-rights cases. If only one side sees
itself as possessing a right, the effects on society of each change will
be lessened. Once each side has been granted its definition of
marriage, changing that definition codes as a loss. Though repeated
switching would surely lead to an overall societal loss, it is unclear
what overall effect the first shock to the system, granting the right to
same-sex marriage (a gain for supporters and a loss for opponents)
would have on society. The percentage of the population on either
side of an issue is not necessarily the best indicator of societal
155
utility. Typically, a couple’s decision to marry is not so timesensitive that a stay pending an appeal will prevent them from ever

153. The same is true if the right is taken away and then reinstated. The order of the
changes does not matter in this context.
154. For example, one such variable would be a federal constitutional amendment banning
same-sex marriage.
155. See supra text accompanying note 152.
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marrying; moreover, any injury that the stay causes can be fixed
156
through a final ruling from the court allowing the couple to marry.
The issue of what happens once a right is granted and then
withdrawn is complicated. Fortunately, it is also easily avoidable. The
Utah district court’s actions implicated the endowment effect because
the court ignored it: had the court considered how temporarily
allowing couples to marry might have affected the public interest, the
balance of factors might have tipped the other way. A more effective
approach in these cases would be that taken by lower courts following
the Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in Kitchen. For example, in De
157
Leon v. Perry, the Western District of Texas held that Texas’s
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage could not
158
withstand even rational-basis review. However, while the court
struck down the amendment and granted a preliminary injunction, it
159
also stayed its decision pending appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
Because the district court in Kitchen did not stay its decision for
the inevitable appeal, it allowed same-sex marriages to be performed
in Utah until the Supreme Court granted a stay. The district court’s
refusal to stay its decision spawned a second lawsuit to clarify the
validity of marriages performed before the Supreme Court’s stay
160
went into effect. In De Leon, the state of Texas caught on to this
issue, noting in its brief in opposition that “[a] preliminary injunction
161
would . . . produce innumerable legal and practical problems.” The

156. There are certain situations in which a stay would so harm particular plaintiffs that it
should not be granted. One such case arose out of Indiana: the Seventh Circuit ordered the state
to recognize one same-sex marriage on an emergency basis because one of the partners was
terminally ill. Order, Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2386 (7th Cir. July 1, 2014); see also Baskin v.
Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1028 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (granting a preliminary injunction upon
finding irreparable harm because the plaintiff was rapidly approaching the average survival time
for ovarian cancer).
157. De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
158. Id. at 662–63. The court sidestepped the issue of whether heightened scrutiny was
warranted because it found that the amendment failed even rational-basis review. See id. at 652
(“[T]he Court finds it is not necessary to apply heightened scrutiny to Plaintiffs’ equal
protection claim since Texas’ ban on same-sex marriage fails even under the most deferential
rational basis level of review.”). Instead, the court saw it as “[l]ikely [that] the Fifth Circuit, and
eventually the United States Supreme Court, will weigh in on this issue with clear instructions.”
Id.
159. Id. at 666.
160. Complaint at 2, Evans v. Utah, No. 2:14-cv-55 (D. Utah Jan. 21, 2014).
161. State Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 26, De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (No. 5:13-cv-982).
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state favorably cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry v. Brown
to stay the district court’s injunction, claiming that “[t]he wisdom of
these decisions is clear: because of the practical ramifications of
temporary injunctive relief, a district court should not permit the
commencement of same-sex marriages when reasonable doubt exists
163
that the district court’s preliminary ruling will remain the law.” It is
difficult to argue that these cases are clear-cut with little chance of
reversal. The state also noted that the “[p]laintiffs do not even
acknowledge, much less offer a solution to, this serious problem with
164
their requested interim relief.”
Possibly, the plaintiffs did not offer a solution because the
solution should have been obvious—stay the injunction until a final
decision is rendered. The De Leon plaintiffs may have been correct
that the same-sex-marriage ban caused them continuing irreparable
harm that outweighed any potential harm the defendants could have
165
suffered. However, failing to stay a preliminary injunction granting
same-sex couples the right to marry disserves the public interest,
which should weigh against granting an injunction. Irrespective of
which side is “correct” or what level of scrutiny applies, the
endowment effect and loss aversion demonstrate that switching back
and forth between legal regimes disserves the public interest by
reducing overall utility. These behavioral-economic concepts
therefore weigh in favor of maintaining the status quo until litigation
has concluded.
Consideration of the behavioral-economic effects would not be
dispositive in every case. Rather, it would bear on the analysis of only
one of the four factors: whether preliminary relief would disserve the
166
public interest. Depending on which formulation of the Winter test a
court uses, consideration of loss aversion and the endowment effect
167
could change its decision. Under the sliding-scale approach, the
probability of reversal would also enter into the analysis of whether a

162. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
163. State Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 161, at 27–28.
164. Id. at 28.
165. See Plaintiffs’ Opposed Motion for Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Defendants from
Enforcing Texas’ Same-Sex Marriage Ban at 47, De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (No. 5:13-cv-982)
(arguing this point).
166. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
167. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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stay or preliminary injunction would disserve the public interest: if
reversal is highly likely, it is also more likely that loss aversion and the
endowment effect will inflict greater societal losses. Additionally, in
individual-rights cases, lower probabilities of reversal may still be
enough to cause the public-interest factor to weigh strongly in one
direction or the other—people value their rights highly, and they
168
could experience significant losses when those rights are withdrawn.
169
Under the strict formulation of the Winter test, in which each factor
must be proven by a preponderance, behavioral-economic
considerations would almost certainly have an effect on the legal
outcome. Therefore, depending on the weight given to this analysis, a
court might be persuaded that a preliminary injunction or stay would
170
disserve the public interest.
The district courts are already recognizing that the Supreme
171
Court’s issuance of a stay in Kitchen indicates a preference for
172
waiting for a final decision. Unfortunately, the Court’s short order
failed to give lower courts any reasoned guidance. Subsequently, the
Court declined to issue stays in same-sex-marriage cases only when a
state refused to defend its law and no one would have standing to do

168. This translates to a steeper value function. See Figure 10.
169. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
170. This would affect only temporary relief because in the case of a final, permanent
injunction there is not the same risk that the district court causes a societal loss.
171. Order in Pending Case, Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014) (No. 13A687).
172. See, e.g., De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 666 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (“In accordance
with the Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in Herbert v. Kitchen, and consistent with the
reasoning provided in Bishop and Bostic, this Court stays execution of this preliminary
injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.”
(citations omitted)); Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014)
(“In accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in a nearly identical case on
appeal from the District Court of Utah to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court stays
execution of this injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.” (citation omitted)), aff’d sub nom. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir.
2014), cert. denied, No. 14-136, 2014 WL 3854318 (Oct. 6, 2014)); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp.
2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“In accordance with the Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in
Kitchen v. Herbert, and consistent with the reasoning provided in Bishop, this Court s[t]ays
execution of this injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals.”), aff’d sub nom. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
No. 14-225, 2014 WL 4230092 (Oct. 6, 2014). In 2004, some members of the Tenth Circuit
invoked behavioral-economic concepts in the context of granting a preliminary injunction. See
O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 1016–17 (10th Cir.
2004) (en banc) (McConnell, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of maintaining the
status quo based on loss aversion and the endowment effect), aff’d and remanded sub nom.
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
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173

so. The apparent reason for the Court’s preference appeared to be
stability—a concern that, as same-sex-marriage cases work their way
through the courts, temporary relief might disserve the public
interest.
Later, however, the Supreme Court changed its tune following
174
the decision to grant certiorari in several same-sex-marriage cases.
When considering the same-sex-marriage case arising out of
175
Alabama, only two members of the Court were in favor of a stay.
The situation in Alabama has been particularly acrimonious.
Following the federal district court’s ruling that the state’s ban on
same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due
176
Process Clause, the chief justice of the state supreme court issued an
order to state probate judges instructing them not to adhere to the
177
federal district court’s ruling. Initially, most counties refused to
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, but the majority have
178
since begun issuing the licenses.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, saw granting a stay as
“reflect[ing] the appropriate respect [the Court] owe[s] to States as
sovereigns and to the people of those States who approved those
179
laws.” He lamented the Court’s denial of the stay “without making
any effort to preserve the status quo pending the Court’s resolution of
180
a constitutional question . . . .” In a situation where the Court “will
181
resolve the issue at hand in several months,” the two Justices were
in favor of maintaining the status quo until a final resolution of the
issue.
Justice Thomas stated that he “would have shown the people of
Alabama the respect they deserve and preserved the status quo while

173. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (holding that private parties do
not have standing to take over the defense of a same-sex-marriage law from the state).
174. DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650, at *1 (Jan. 16, 2015).
175. Strange v. Searcy, No. 14A840, 2015 WL 505563, at *1 (Feb. 9, 2015).
176. Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-208-CG-N, 2015 WL 328728, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015).
177. Roy S. Moore, State of Alabama—Judicial System: Administrative Order of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court (Feb. 8, 2015), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/CJ-Moore-legal-memo-2-8-14.pdf.
178. Sandhya Somashekhar, A Majority of Alabama Counties Are Now Issuing Same Sex
Marriage Licenses, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2015/02/13/a-majority-of-alabama-counties-are-now-issuing-same-sex-marriagelicenses.
179. Strange, 2015 WL 505563, at *1.
180. Id. at *2.
181. Id.
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the Court resolves this important constitutional question.” In this
case, Justice Thomas framed the status quo as the state of Alabama
being able to enforce its law until a final determination on the
constitutional question by the Supreme Court. As this example
shows, when considering behavioral-economic effects, the publicinterest prong of the test weighs in favor of maintaining the status quo
until a final decision is rendered.
V. ANOTHER APPLICATION: ABORTION RESTRICTIONS
Staying an injunction is not what is truly at issue here—
endowment-effect analysis suggests that maintaining the status quo is,
183
in many cases, preferable until a final decision is rendered. This
concept applies more broadly than in the same-sex-marriage realm
alone. This issue arises most prominently in individual-rights cases in
184
which people’s fundamental rights are at issue. In the same-sexmarriage context, if a district court grants an injunction requiring the
state to issue same-sex-marriage licenses, it should also stay its ruling
pending appeal, maintaining the status quo and preventing a societal
utility loss that would otherwise result.
185
In O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft,
some members of the Tenth Circuit recognized that behavioraleconomic effects, specifically the endowment effect, should inform

182. Id.
183. Naturally, explicit consideration of the status quo would generate argument over what,
precisely, the status quo is. Compare Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health
Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 506, 509 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (framing the status quo as the
legal landscape before the enactment of new abortion restrictions), with id. at 507 (majority
opinion) (framing the status quo as democratically elected officials’ ability to enact laws of their
choosing). The proper formulation of the status quo is the last actual, peaceable, noncontested
status that preceded the pending controversy. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 2948. The
last peaceable moment will typically be the world just before the event that led to the lawsuit. In
the context of conferring the right to same-sex-marriage, the last peaceable moment would be a
world without same-sex marriage. In the case of a law restricting access to abortion, it would be
a world without that law.
184. A similar logic would apply in other individual-rights contexts as well. For instance, in
the voting-rights context, restricting access to voting due to a potentially unconstitutional law
would weigh in favor of granting the injunction because it disserves the public interest.
Similarly, in the Eighth Amendment arena, the fact that dangerous prisoners might need to be
commingled while an appeal was pending could persuade a court to stay its decision until a final
judgment is rendered.
185. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir.
2004) (en banc), aff’d and remanded sub nom. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
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the legal analysis of injunctions. With respect to the issuance of
preliminary injunctions, the concurrence noted that
adverse disruptions in the status quo carry along with them the cost
and difficulty associated with adjusting to change. These involve not
only direct transition costs but also the costs associated with
uncertainty, which manifest themselves in a reluctance to invest
human or other capital in an enterprise where the returns could
disappear at the drop of a judicial hat. Disruption is expensive.
When a court requires a change in the status quo only to find that its
grant of preliminary relief was mistaken and must be undone, the
process is twice as disruptive as when the court preserves the status
quo on a preliminary basis and later issues a final judgment
186
requiring the change.

The concurrence properly considered a preliminary injunction’s
effect on the status quo, but could have couched it more obviously in
behavioral-economic principles. “Fundamentally, the reluctance to
disturb the status quo prior to trial on the merits is an expression of
187
judicial humility.” Not only does “a court bear[] more direct moral
responsibility for harms that result from its intervention than from its
nonintervention, and more direct responsibility when it intervenes to
change the status quo than when it intervenes to preserve it,” but also
“like the doctrine of stare decisis, preserving the status quo serves to
188
protect the settled expectations of the parties.”
The logic of the O Centro concurrence has since received
189
attention; the Tenth Circuit, even after Winter, applies a heightened
190
burden of proof if an injunction would alter the status quo. In
determining whether to grant preliminary relief, the proper approach
would be to use the existing four-factor framework to consider the
effect of any change in the status quo on the public interest. Rather
than applying a heightened burden for status-quo-altering stays and
preliminary injunctions, that alteration of the status quo can weigh
against issuing an injunction because it disserves the public interest.
In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly considered the status quo in

186. Id. at 1016–17 (McConnell, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 1015.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Powers, supra note 14, at 1029–30 (discussing the case).
190. See, e.g., Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (D. Colo. 2012) (“If the
injunction will . . . alter the status quo . . . the movant must meet a heightened burden.” (citing
O Centro, 389 F.3d at 975, aff’d, 542 F. App’x 706 (10th Cir. 2013))).
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deciding whether to grant a stay in another context: abortion
restrictions.
The Western District of Texas considered a state law requiring
abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a hospital within
191
thirty miles of their clinics. The district court held that, although the
state had a legitimate interest in promoting the health of both the
mother and the fetus, the admitting-privileges provision bore no
192
rational relationship to that interest. The court did not stay its
193
194
decision. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit granted a stay. The Supreme
195
Court denied a motion to vacate the stay in a divided order. The
196
Fifth Circuit has since reversed the district court’s decision. Based
on the above analysis, it is tempting to say that the stay was rightly
granted, as it allowed the status quo to continue as usual until the
final disposition of the case. That conclusion would, however, ignore
the realities of the situation. As Justice Breyer noted in dissent,
“under the status quo that existed in Texas prior to the enactment of
the admitting privileges requirement, women across the State of
Texas who needed abortions had a certain level of access to clinics
197
that would provide them.” In other words, at the last peaceable
198
moment women in Texas enjoyed a right of access to the clinics, one
on which they certainly placed some value. “If allowed to stand, the
District Court’s injunction would maintain that status quo pending
199
the decision of th[e] case by the Court of Appeals.”
The Fifth Circuit should not have granted the stay. By doing so,
the court effectively closed abortion clinics across the state when the
only existing ruling was the district court’s, which found that there
191. The law required that any physician performing an abortion have admitting privileges
at a hospital that provides obstetrical or gynecological healthcare services within thirty miles of
the place where the abortion took place. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031 (West
2014).
192. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d
891, 909 (W.D. Tex. 2013), rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g denied, 769 F.3d 330
(5th Cir. 2014).
193. See id. (granting the injunction with no mention of a stay).
194. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs., 734 F.3d at 419.
195. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 506,
506–07 (2013).
196. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs., 748 F.3d at 605.
197. On Emergency Application to Vacate Stay at 3, Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex.
Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 506, 509 (2013) (No. 13A452) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
198. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 2948.
199. On Emergency Application to Vacate Stay, supra note 197, at 3.
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200

was no rational basis for the law. If the district court’s decision had
instead been affirmed, the clinics would not have magically
reopened—the stay would have changed the legal landscape in Texas.
The proper response would have been to allow the clinics to
continue to operate normally. Closing the clinics due to a law that is
ultimately held to be unconstitutional would certainly weigh in favor
of the stay disserving the public interest. Declining to issue stays in
such circumstances would prevent the confusion and uncertainty that
result from granting and then withdrawing rights. This approach
would not implicate the loss-aversion consequences identified above.
Instead, society would remain at the status quo until a final judgment
was issued. By either not allowing a ruling to change the law or not
allowing a potentially unconstitutional law to take effect—and
therefore administering only one shock to the legal system—courts
can prevent the overall societal loss that happens when a legal right is
granted and then taken away.
As the Seventh Circuit put it in its opinion refusing to issue a stay
in a similar situation, “It is beyond dispute that the plaintiffs face
greater harm irreparable by the entry of a final judgment in their
favor than the irreparable harm that the state faces if the
201
implementation of its statute is delayed.” This observation affects
whether a stay would disserve the public interest—the public interest
will always be broader than simply what the state wants, although the
state’s desires are relevant. Because of the nature of the right being
taken away, “delay in obtaining an abortion can result in the
progression of a pregnancy to a stage at which an abortion would be
202
less safe, and eventually illegal.” Because “[t]he state . . . made no
attempt to show an offsetting harm from a delay of a few months in
203
the implementation of its new law (should it be upheld after trial),”
the Seventh Circuit rightly declined to grant a stay.

200. At the time of the case, there were thirty-six abortion clinics in Texas, at least a third of
which had to close as a result of the new restrictions. See Emergency Application to Vacate Stay
at 7, Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs., 134 S. Ct. 506 (No. 13A452).
201. Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 795 (7th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014).
202. Id. at 796.
203. Id. at 797.
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CONCLUSION
Due to the endowment effect and loss aversion, losing something
elicits a stronger reaction than gaining it. Courts should explicitly
consider this phenomenon under the not-disserving-the-publicinterest prong in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction
or stay a grant of an injunction pending appeal in cases involving
individual-rights issues like same-sex marriage. Temporary and
permanent relief affect the public interest differently because of the
likelihood that the judgment will change. Each reversal of a change in
who possesses a right disserves the public interest because people do
not value their rights at the rights’ objective worth. Although this may
not comport with the assumption of the rational-economic actor,
courts should consider people’s different reactions to losses and gains
in deciding whether to grant temporary relief.

